A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data by Katz, Jonathan & King, Gary
 
A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Katz, Jonathan, and Gary King. 1999. A statistical model for
multiparty electoral data. American Political Science Review
93(1): 15-32.
Published Version doi:10.2307/2585758
Accessed February 18, 2015 1:11:09 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3992146
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAAmerican Political Science Review  Vol. 93, No. 1  March 1999 
A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data 
JONATHAN N. KATZ University of  Chicago 
GARY KING Haward  University 
W 
e propose a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, district-level elections. This 
model, which provides a tool  for comparative politics research analogous to that which regression 
analysis provides  in the American  two-party context,  can be  used  to explain  or predict  how 
geographic  distributions  of  electoral  results  depend  upon  economic  conditions,  neighborhood  ethnic 
compositions, campaign spending, and other features of the election campaign or aggregate areas. We  also 
provide new graphical representations for data exploration, model evaluation, and substantive interpretation. 
We illustrate the use of this model by attempting to resolve a controversy over the size of and trend in the 
electoral advantage of incumbency in Britain.  Contraiy to previous  analyses, all based on measures now 
known to be biased, we demonstrate that the advantage is small but meaningfkl, varies substantially across 
the  parties, and is not growing. Finally, we show how to estimate the  party from which each  party's advantage 
is predominantly drawn. 
w 
e propose the first internally consistent statis- 
tical model for analyzing multiparty, district- 
level aggregate election data. Our model can 
be  applied  directly  to  explain  or  predict  how  the 
geographic  distribution  of  electoral  results  depends 
upon economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic com- 
positions, campaign spending, or other features of  the 
election campaign or characteristics of  the aggregate 
areas. We also provide several new graphical represen- 
tations for help in data exploration, model evaluation, 
and substantive interpretation.1 
Our  general  model  is  intended  to  address  three 
serious lacunae in  the study of  comparative politics. 
First, most literatures focusing on non-American elec- 
tions are dominated by  survey data alone rather than 
also including studies of  real election results.2 Survey 
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Our model  can  also  be  used  to  evaluate  features  of  electoral 
systems, such  as  whether  the districting system is  fair  to  all  the 
political parties and electorally responsive, although we leave details 
of  this task to future work. 
A few examples of  the good survey analyses conducted in multi- 
party  democracies  include those in  England  (e.g.,  Goodhart  and 
research has enormous advantages for studying indi- 
vidual-level  preferences,  but  as  analyses  of  random 
selections of  isolated individuals from unknown geo- 
graphical  locations,  they  necessarily  miss  much  of 
electoral politics. As such, they are often best comple- 
mented with studies of  aggregate electoral returns. 
Second, with  surprisingly few exceptions, electoral 
analyses in comparative politics based on real election 
returns use national rather than regional, district, or 
precinct-level data.3 This approach has the advantage 
of  allowing  more  countries  to  be  included  in  the 
analysis without much data collection effort, but it also 
has  serious  disadvantages.  Aggregate  national-level 
studies prevent researchers from learning where votes 
come from and why, and they generally result in studies 
based  on  small  numbers  of  observations  and  little 
variation  on  many  relevant  dimensions.  Studies  of 
postwar OECD countries usually contain only about a 
dozen observations (see Paldam 1991,18,  Table I), and 
analvses of former communist countries could include 
onlithree or four free elections. This is often insuffi- 
cient information with which to parse out many of  the 
interesting effects, and it ignores the substantial infor- 
mation  content  in  the  often vast  differences  across 
different regions of  a country. 
Finally,  the  vast  majority  of  electoral  studies  in 
multiparty democracies dichotomize the electoral sys- 
tem into a pseudo-two-party contest. Researchers an- 
alyze the vote for the incumbent party versus all others 
grouped together, or the vote for a-particular group, 
such as left-wing parties, versus the combination of  all 
Bhansali  1970), Mexico  (Dominguez  and  McCann  1996), Poland 
(Przeworski 1996), Peru (Stokes 1996), Russia (White et al. 1997), 
Denmark (Miller and Listhaug 1985),  Italy (Bellucci 1984), and West 
Germany (Frey and Schneider 1980) as well as multicountry studies 
(Lewis-Beck 1988), among many others. 
Such national-level studies have used data from France (Rosa and 
Amson 1976), Japan (Inoguchi 1980), England (Whiteley 1980), and 
Italy (Bellucci 1984); time-series of cross-sectional data from multi- 
ple countries (Host and Paldam 1990; Paldam 1986,1991; Powell and 
Whitten  1993);  and  single  cross-sections  of  multiple  countries 
(Lewis-Beck and Bellucci 1982), among many others. Subnational 
analyses include Bellucci (1984, 1991), Conford, Dorling, and Tether 
(1995), Rattinger (1991), Slider (1994). A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
the others. This procedure has the advantage of  en- 
abling the use of standard statistical methods, but since 
these methods  are best applied to the study of  two- 
party systems (largely in U.S. data), two serious prob- 
lems result: bias and information loss. The procedure is 
biased whenever all parties do not field candidates in 
every  election  district. For  example, even when  the 
governing party contests every election, different num- 
bers  of  parties  composing  the "other"  category will 
generally have large effects on a variable such as the 
percentage of the vote for the governing party. Because 
the vote  a party expects to receive will  normally be 
related  to whether  it runs a candidate, the observed 
variable will systematically overstate the true underly- 
ing  support  for  the  governing  party  when  its  true 
support is highest. For example, when the governing 
party  is  expected  to  do  so  well  that  it  scares  off 
opposition parties from running their own candidates, 
the fraction of  the vote actually received by  the gov- 
erning party will exceed its true support in the elector- 
ate. This, and other similar problems, can combine to 
induce severe bias in inferences based on such data. 
Moreover, even if  partially contested elections hap- 
pen to cause no bias in  a particular  case, important 
information, critical to comparative politics, is always 
lost by  these  methods. For example, when the eco- 
nomic pain caused by promarket reforms in postcom- 
munist countries results in the reformers being thrown 
out of  office (Przeworski 1991), or when the increasing 
salience of  ethnic divisions upsets the political order 
(Horowitz 1985, 1993; Offe 1992; Tucker 1996), which 
parties benefit? How do the electoral fortunes of  each 
of  the  parties  depend  on  the  degree  of  economic 
hardship or ethnic divisions? Answering these  ques- 
tions about multiparty systems requires statistical mod- 
els  that  permit  multiparty outcomes. Shoehorning a 
complex multiparty democracy into a fake two-party 
system in order to perform an analysis that looks like 
those conducted in American politics takes the wrong 
lessons  from  that  subfield.  Making  methodological 
decisions merely to accommodate the requirements of 
familiar  statistical  methods  risks  missing  the  most 
distinctive  and  interesting  aspects  of  the  electoral 
system under analysis. The bottom line is that multi- 
party systems require  the development of  multiparty 
statistical models. It would appear that much substan- 
tive  knowledge can be gained, and bias reduced, by 
designing models of  electoral systems with the special 
features of  these systems in mind. 
Although we intend our model to be applicable to a 
wide variety of  multiparty electoral data, we apply it 
here to resolve one important scholarly controversy: 
the size of  and  trend  in  the electoral  advantage of 
incumbency in the United Kingdom. For decades, the 
conventional wisdom has been that U.K.  incumbency 
advantage is small to nonexistent and not increasing, 
but  this  conclusion  has  come  under  strong  attack 
recently by researchers whose results seem to show that 
incumbency advantage is moderate to large and grow- 
ing fast. Unfortunately, it turns out that all estimates 
given  in  the literature  are based  on measures  now 
known to be biased. In partial agreement and disagree- 
ment with the substantive results from both sides, we 
demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is  small 
but markedly different for each of Britain's three major 
parties.  Our  methods  also  provide  information  that 
others have  not  attempted  to estimate,  such as the 
party from which each party's incumbency advantage is 
primarily drawn. The study of incumbency advantage in 
the  United  States  has  been  greatly  enhanced  by  a 
quarter-century  of  scholarly work that  has increased 
the precision and  accuracy of  estimates in  this two- 
party system, and we hope a similar gain will result in 
electoral studies of multiparty democracies, such as the 
United Kingdom. 
From a methodological perspective, analyses of  ag- 
gregate electoral data fall into two fundamental cate- 
gories that should be carefully distinguished-contex- 
tual  effects  and  ecological  inferences.  Research 
questions  about  the  relationships; among  aggregate 
variables require a model of contextual effects, such as 
that  offered  here  (or,  e.g.,  Huckfeldt  and  Sprague 
1993). In contrast, research questions about the char- 
acteristics of  the individuals who make up aggregate 
electoral  data  require  ecological  inferences and  the 
special models  designed for  this  purpose  (see  King 
1997). For example, a study of the effect on the vote for 
more liberal parties  of  having a college in town is a 
contextual effect, for which the model we  propose is 
directly useful. In contrast, using aggregate electoral 
data to study whether college students are more likely 
than others to vote for liberal political parties requires 
an ecological inference. Our statistical model applies to 
questions  at  the  district  level,  such  as  incumbency 
advantage estimates or predicting which candidate will 
win. Formal models of  individual behavior may be of 
interest  for  some purposes, but  they are not  always 
necessary in cases like these. For much of our discus- 
sion, we make the common assumption that candidates 
are strategic and well informed. Our working (testable) 
assumption about voters  is  that,  conditional  on  the 
candidates, their voting behavior follows regular pat- 
terns of  some sort. 
In the sections that follow, we briefly describe our 
motivating substantive problem, discuss the more gen- 
eral characteristics of  multiparty electoral data, sum- 
marize the problems that need to be resolved in order 
to develop a general statistical model for these data, 
introduce a simple version of  the model for cases in 
which all parties contest, introduce assumptions to deal 
with  partially contested  elections, and  show  how  to 
estimate the model and compute quantities of interest 
from these estimates. We present substantive results as 
the model is developed. 
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Until the 1980s, scholars generally agreed that British 
elections were decided by national and not local forces. 
The electoral advantage of incumbency was thought to American Political Science Review  Vol. 93. No. 1 
be  essentially nonexistent  in  Britain.4  For  example, 
Butler and Stokes (1969, 6) repeatedly emphasize "the 
importance  of  national political issues and events as 
opposed to more local influences on the choice of  the 
individual elector." They even go so far as to conclude 
(p. 8) that "so important are the [national] parties in 
giving meaning to contests in the individual parliamen- 
tary  constituencies  in  Britain  that  for  many  voters 
candidates have no identity other then their partisan 
one" (see also Butler and Kavanagh 1980, 292). 
The few numerical estimates of  incumbency advan- 
tage  in  Britain  come  from  a  newer  liteiature  that 
contradicts  this  conventional wisdom.  For  example, 
Curtice and Steed (1980, 1983) find the "sophomore 
surge" for Labour-the  average difference in the vote 
for Labour in  open seats it wins and the vote in the 
subsequent  election  for  the  now-incumbent Labour 
party candidate-was  about 1,500 votes (about 3.8%) 
in  the  1979 and  1983 elections. Norton  and  Wood 
(1990) modify sophomore surge by  correcting for re- 
gional swings and find a surge of  1.6% for the Conser- 
vatives  and  a remarkable  7.8%  for  Labour.  Finally, 
Wood  and Norton (1992), along with the prominent 
survey-based analyses of  Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
(1987),  also  strongly  argue  for  the proposition  that 
incumbency advantage is increasing. 
Although the idea  of  sophomore surge, on which 
most measures are based, is very intuitive, Gelman and 
King (1990) prove that it gives biased estimates of  the 
causal effect  of  incumbency. In fact, in  Britain, the 
problem  may  actually  be  worse  than  in  two-party 
systems: Because most British elections have very few 
sophomores (usually only about two dozen), the mea- 
sure discards more than 95% of  the district observa- 
tions and is therefore exceptionally inefficient. More- 
over, the measure is usually applied without controls 
and without any feature of  the statistical model which 
recognizes that  the system being analyzed has more 
than two parties. 
Thus, we have .on one side the conventional wisdom, 
based  on  many  years  of  traditional  analyses,  that 
incumbents have no electoral advantage. On the other 
side, we have a growing systematic quantitative litera- 
ture which  argues that the incumbency advantage is 
moderate to large and steadily growing. We hope to 
resolve this scholarly dispute. 
Our data for this article include constituency-level 
election results from England for 1959 to 1992. We also 
have more limited data from the 1955 elections, which 
we  use  whenever  possible.  Geographic  districts  in 
England are called "constituencies," but we use the two 
words  interchangeably  because  our  model  applies 
more generally. For convenience, we usually refer to 
The concept of the "personal vote" is used in Britain to include any 
local,  candidate-specific  effects,  but  for  empirical  analyses  it  is 
normally treated synonymously with incumbency advantage. In the 
United States the personal vote is considered to be the fraction of the 
incumbent's  advantage attributable to the person  rather than  the 
party. For this article, we use only the total effect and refer to it as the 
"incumbency  advantage,"  as  is  most  common  in  the  American 
political science literature (see Gelman and King 1990 for a formal 
definition). 
the  Liberal  Party  and  its  alliance  with  the  Social 
Democratic Party more simply as the Alliance.5 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTIPARTY DATA 
We now identify the statistically important character- 
istics of  multiparty electoral data. We first do so in 
simple algebraic terms and then translate the algebra 
into a useful graphic display. 
Let  Vij  denote  the  proportion  of  the  yote  (the 
underline denotes our mnemonic labeling convention) 
in district i (i = 1, .  .  . ,  n) for party j (j  = 1, . . . ,  J). 
Two fundamental  features of  multiparty voting data 
are that each proportion falls within the unit interval 
V-,. E  [0, 11 for all i and j,  (1) 
and the set of vote proportions for all the parties in a 
district sum to one: 
J 
Vij = 1 for all i.  (2) 
j=1 
Thus, an important criterion of  a good (and logically 
possible) statistical model of  multiparty voting data is 
that it satisfies the constraints in equations 1 and 2. 
Variables that meet these constraints fall in a region 
generally referred to as the simplex. 
We now illustrate this simplex sample space graph- 
ically for the two- and then the three-party case. For 
each case, we apply a simple trick to reduce the number 
of  dimensions required, making the graphical presen- 
tation  more manageable  and  ultimately informative, 
without  losing  information.  The graphic version  of 
these relationships will also be useful for exploring the 
data and understanding the model fit. 
For  the  two-party  example, we  use  ViD  for  the 
Democratic and ViR for the Republican shares of  the 
vote in district i for candidates for the U.S.  House of 
Representatives.  Obviously,  we  can  easily  represent 
both variables by just one, say, ViD, since the other is 
merely ViR = 1 - ViD. Figure 1A plots ViD by  ViR. 
Because of the constraint in equation 2, all district vote 
fractions fall on a single line segment, and due to the 
constraint in equation 1, the line ends at the axes. Thus, 
all the points in the two-dimensional plane in Figure 
1A fall  on  a  simpler one-dimensional line segment. 
Presenting this line segment in Figure 1B reduces the 
problem from two to one dimension without losing any 
information. 
Figure 2 provides analogous information for three 
parties. Figure 2A plots in three dimensions the three 
variables from the British electoral system, Vie,  ViL, 
and Vd,  for the Conservative, Labour, and Alliance 
vote proportions, respectively. The constraints in equa- 
5 We began with the data set "British General Elections, 1955-1992," 
(version  8,  August  1993), constructed  by  D.F.L.  Dorling  of  the 
University of Newcastle, extracted data from England only, updated 
it,  and added information  on incumbency status.  The number  of 
observations in our data for each election year are: 1955, 460; 1959, 
460;  1964, 455; 1966, 488;  1970, 471; 1974 (Feb.), 463;  1974 (Oct.), 
491; 1979, 467;  1983, 491; 1987, 522; and 1992, 521. A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
FIGURE 1.  The Sim~lex  for Two Parties 
A. 2 Parties, 2 Dimensions 
0  .25  .5  -75  1 
ViD 
B. 2 Parties, 1 Dimension 
Mote: This figure explains graphically how to reduce two vote variables 
to  one dimension. Graph A portrays the familiar relationship between 
the  vote for the Republicans (V,,) and Democrats (V,,)  in the  U.S. 
two-party system; because of the constraints of equations 1 and 2,  all 
soints fall on a line segment  and can be portrayed more simply as 
Braph B. 
tion 2 imply that valid points must fall on the plane 
cutting through the three-dimensional space. The con- 
straints in equation 1  require this plane to end at each 
of the three axes. The resulting area that satisfies both 
constraints is the equilateral triangle shaded in A. 
Because all the points in three dimensions fall in a 
two-dimensional area, we can save space by presenting 
the triangle alone in two dimensions, which we do in 
Figure 2B. This graph is a version of  a ternary diagram 
(or trilinear,  triaxial, or barycentric plot;  see Upton 
1989,  1994), to  which  we  have  added  several  new 
features. In this triangle, each dot fully characterizes a 
single constituency result from the 1979 British elec- 
tion. Roughly speaking, the closer a dot is to a vertex 
(with a party's label, C, L, or A), the higher is the vote 
total for that party; more precisely, a vote total for a 
party equals the perpendicular distance from the side 
of  the  triangle  opposite  to  the  labeled  vertex,  as 
calibrated on the scales we  have added. That is.  the 
vertical positions of  the dots in the figure indicate the 
values of  Vic, as indicated on the scale on the left. As 
a dot falls farther from the side opposite the L vertex, 
the  larger  is  the 6, variable  (as  can  be  seen  by 
comparing the point to the scale at the top). 
For exam~le.  in addition to the real data. we have 
added one (hypothetical) election result as a small box 
in the bottom left of Figure 2B. In order to clarify how 
to read  the voting  results in  this  district. we  added 
dashed lines conn&ting this point to the three axes. In 
this  district, the Conservatives received  25%  of  the 
vote, as can be seen by following the dashed line from 
the box to the left axis that calibrates V,,.  The dashed 
line traces the shortest distance from 'the axis to the 
point, that is, a line perpendicular to the axis. The same 
district also gave 25% of  its vote to the Labour Party 
(see the dashed line that heads northward to the V,, 
axis)  and  half  its votes  to  the Alliance  (as  can  be 
determined from the dashed line that heads down to 
the right to meet the V,  axis). The electoral results for 
all the real districts, represented by  dots, also can be 
read by  tracing out perpendicular  lines to each axis. 
With all this precision available when needed, it is still 
'  worth remembering the easier rough way to interpret 
this ternary diagram: The closer a point is to a vertex of 
the triangle, the more votes that district gave to the 
party whose label appears there. 
We have removed most of the sides of the triangle in 
order to make visible districts with zero votes for one of 
the parties. For example, districts uncontested by  the 
Alliance fall on the right side of the triangle, where the 
bottom axis reveals that V,  = 0. Substantively, these 
partially contested districts appear to be generated by a 
different  process than  the mass  of  (fully  contested) 
districts that fall inside the triangle. This can be seen 
since the distribution of points does not gradually get 
smaller (or larger)  as it  approaches  the side of  the 
triangle; instead, there appears to be an area without 
dots, indicating every party that merely appears on the 
ballot receives at least 15-20%  of the vote. 
We have also added lines that divide the triangle into 
thirds.  We  call  these win  lines,  since they  indicate 
which party wins, depending on the region in which a 
point falls. For example, if  a point falls in the region at 
the top of  the graph, the Conservatives win a plurality 
of the votes and (by the electoral rules) the seat for that 
constituency. Points that fall within the left region are 
wins for the Alliance, and those in the right go to the 
Labour  Party. The same logic applies to multiparty 
elections with J  > 3  parties,  even though  graphical 
displays become more unwieldy. 
PROBLEMS TO RESOLVE 
Standard regression-type models applied to multiparty 
electoral data usually generate nonsensical results. For American Political Science Review  Vol. 93, No. 1 
FIGURE 2.  The Simplex for Three Parties 
A. 3 Parties, 3 Dimensions  B. 3 Parties, 2 Dimensions 
0 
Note: In a manner analogous to Figure 1, this figure reduces three vote variables to two dimensions. Graph A portrays  the relationship among the votes 
for the Conservative  (V,/,,),  labour (Vi,),  and Alliance (V,)  parties; because of the constraints of equations 1 and 2, all points fall on an equilateral triangle 
that is the intersection of a plane with the three dimensional figure. Graph B portrays this more simply in two dimensions in a version of what is known 
as a "ternary diagram." Values of the three variables can be read by where the dots fall perpendicular to the three numbered axes. The little square point 
(with dotted lines referencing the axes) is the example discussed in the text. 
example, one common approach is to use the vote for 
each party as a dependent variable (fraction for the 
Conservatives, fraction for the Labour Party, etc.) and 
to regress each on a set of explanatory variables. These 
J regressions are run separately, or via  a "seemingly 
unrelated"  system  of  equations.  Since  neither  con- 
straint  from equations  1 and  2  is  satisfied, this  ap- 
proach generally fails to give sensible results. That is, 
the results often imply that some parties will get fewer 
than zero votes, or that the sum of votes for all parties 
will be greater or less than 100%. Moreover, even when 
point predictions happen to fall within the constraints 
of the simplex, the full probabilistic implications of the 
model are virtually always logically impossible, as some 
of  the predictive density always falls outside the sim- 
plex.  Some of  the few  who  recognize this  problem 
transform  Kj to an unbounded scale (separately for 
each party j), such as with a logistic function, and then 
apply separate or seeming unrelated regressions, but 
this, too, is insufficient: The results will satisfy equation 
1 but  not  equation 2.  Similarly, running only J - 1 
regressions and computing the predictions for ViJ  from 
the  others  satisfies equation  2  but  not  equation  1. 
Various  other  ad  hoc  approaches  can  be taken  to 
correct different parts of  the problem, but  especially 
because computing most quantities of interest requires 
the full probabilistic model, we  decided to pursue  a 
more general approach. 
The model we develop can be considered a general- 
ization of two independent lines of  statistical research. 
The first line includes models for "compositional data" 
(Aitchison 1986), a term that describes data sets with 
multiple outcome variables that sum to unity for each 
observation. A few of the many examples of  composi- 
tional data from other fields include soil  samples in 
geology and pedology (with measurements of the frac- 
tions of sand, silt, and clay), rock samples in geochem- 
' istry (with fractions of  alkali, Fe203, and M,O),  and 
blood measurements in biology (proportions of  white 
blood cell types measured for each patient). Composi- 
tional data are also common in political science and 
economics (as in multiparty voting data, the allocation 
of ministerial portfolios among political parties, trade 
flows or international  conflict directed from each na- 
tion to several others, or proportions of budget expen- 
ditures in each of several categories), but researchers in 
these fields have not taken advantage of the connection 
to this more general statistical approach. That is un- 
fortunate,  because  compositional  data  seem  to  be 
closely related to the raison d'&tre of  political science A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
research: If  politics is  the authoritative  allocation of 
resources, then fractions of resources received by each 
group are exactly compositional data. 
The key contribution of  this literature is statistical 
models that  allow  only possible  outcomes  to occur. 
That is, predictions or simulations from such a model 
satisfy equations  1 and  2  or, in  other words,  have 
positive density only over the simplex. The most influ- 
ential models of  compositional data are due primarily 
to  Aitchison  (1986),  who  criticized  earlier  models 
based on Dirichlet distributions (see citations in Aitchi- 
son 1986, 61-2),  since those models require the ratios 
of  "compositions" (votes for each party in our applica- 
tion) to be independent. Aitchison avoided this unre- 
alistic assumption by  applying the normal distribution 
to the log-ratios of  the individual components. This 
procedure starts with the multivariate normal fit to the 
unconstrained real plane  and then  maps it  into the 
simplex via  the  multivariate  logistic  transformation. 
This  works  in  the  same  way  as,  for  example,  the 
log-normal maps the real number line onto the positive 
real numbers. 
The second line of  research that we  generalize are 
models  of  votes  and  seats  for  two-party  systems 
(Gelman  and King  1991, 1994a, 1994b; King  1989a; 
King and Browning 1987; King and Gelman 1991) and 
for multiparty systems (King 1990). Like compositional 
models,  some  of  these  vote  and  seat  models  also 
transform votes (in different ways) using logistic trans-. 
formations  and  then  stochastically model  the trans- 
formed variables. The resulting statistical models differ 
in a variety of ways, but they also constrain the result to 
the proper sample space so that equations 1  and 2 are 
satisfied. 
Unfortunately, the models from neither line of  re- 
search will  work without modification for multiparty 
voting data. One problem is that our extensive evalu- 
ations of  the assumptions of  normality underlying the 
models proposed  for  compositional data  (which we 
present belowj indicate that they do not fit real election 
data. Another problem is that these models also do not 
capture  a  fundamental  feature  of  voting  data:  the 
pattern of "missing data" that occurs when at least one 
party  receives  zero  votes  in  a  district,  as  when  it 
presents no candidate for election in a district. Zero 
vote totals in electoral data constitute politically crucial 
information and therefore must be treated very differ- 
ently from examples in which zeros entries are consid- 
ered indicators of  missing data, due to slight measure- 
ment  error  (as when instruments for  measuring the 
compositions of  soil samples miss the always-present 
traces of some elements). The models discussed above 
for analyses of seats and votes fit two-party systems well 
and (King 1990) they can fit multiparty data on seats 
given votes, and some of these include special features 
for  uncontested  districts, but  they  are  not  directly 
applicable to explaining or predicting multiparty elec- 
toral data. 
Thus, a proper model of multiparty voting data must 
have the following special features. It must have posi- 
tive  density  only  over  the  simplex and  must  use  a 
distribution more flexible than the multivariate normal, 
which does not fit real voting data. It also must allow 
covariates (explanatory variables). Below, we  provide 
this basic model for fully contested district elections. 
The model also must provide special features to deal 
with uncontested and partially contested seats, which 
we do in the subsequent section. The complete likeli- 
hood function is then given. 
Finally, a proper model must allow for estimates of 
precisely the quantities of  scholarly interest, and these 
may differ across applications. That is, we should not 
have to teach readers to interpret the arcane results of 
statistical models; rather, the models should be modi- 
fied to produce  results in  the form of  most  natural 
interest  to  substantively  oriented  political  scientists. 
For example, the raw coefficients estimated by models 
of compositional data are not the quantities of interest 
for any political or, indeed, virtuallx any nonpolitical 
application. We use methods of  simulation, described 
below, to compute estimates of  a wide range of  theo- 
retically interesting quantities. These methods are crit- 
ical to political science applications of this new model. 
We also believe the methods will enable those in other 
scholarly disciplines, who use somewhat related models 
for  very  different  purposes,  to  compute  numerical 
quantities of  more interest to their research than the 
usual results of  compositional data models. 
THE BASIC MODEL FOR FULLY 
CONTESTED ELECTIONS 
In this section, we only consider district elections in 
which all parties contest and every party gets at least 
one vote:  Vij  E  (0,  1) for  all  i  and j.  Because, in 
practice, no officially registered candidate who appears 
on the ballot ever gets fewer than 15-20%  of  the vote 
in our data, the only real assumption here is that all 
parties contest all district elections. We generalize this 
model to deal with partially contested elections in the 
next section. 
Let Vi  = (Vil, . .  . ,  Vi(j-,))  be a (J -  1) X 1  vector 
for each district i (i = 1, .  . . ,  n). This vector contains 
all  the information  in  the individual  vote  fractions, 
since the votes for party J can be computed determin- 
istically from the others: 
The model we are about to propose is "symmetric"  in 
the sense that changing the party labeled J does not 
affect anything of  substantive importance. 
Aitchison (1986) proposes that compositional data 
like Vi  be  modeled with his  additive logistic normal 
distribution. This distribution can be formed as follows. 
First let  Yi  be  the vector of J - 1 log-ratios Yij  = 
ln(VijlViJ), for party j (j  = 1 .  .  . ,  J - 1) relative to 
party J. Then assume that the (J -  1) X 1  vector Yi  = 
(Yil, .  . . ,  Yi(,-,))  is  multivariate normal with mean American Political Science Review  Vol. 93, No. 1 
vector p and variance matrix Z. To get to the observed 
votes, use the multivariate logistic transformation: 
Although  compositional data  analysts  have  found 
this specification to be useful for their applications, we 
demonstrate below that it is inappropriate for multi- 
party voting data. In our data, a majority of  districts 
tend to be more highly clustered, and a minority much 
more widely  dispersed, than the multivariate normal 
implies. 
Political scientists modeling seats  and  votes  have 
avoided this distributional problem by  combining mix- 
tures of  independent normals and appropriately cho- 
sen covariates, but these solutions are insufficient for a 
general approach to multiparty voting data. 
We  now  derive  a  new  model  that  solves  these 
problems. We label the distribution the additive logistic 
Student t  (LT) distribution, which we  demonstrate is 
superior when used to fit political data to the additive 
logistic normal, which it includes as a limiting special 
case. To  derive  the  LT distribution,  first  let  Yi  be 
multivariate Student t  (Johnson and Kotz 1972) and 
then apply the transformation in equation 4: 
= T[ln(Vi/Vir>l  pi, Z]lnJ-l Vii 
j= 1 
where  the  extra  factor  in  the  denominator  is  the 
Jacobian of  the transformation (required when creat- 
ing a new distribution from an existing one through a 
deterministic transformation), the expected value and 
variance of  Y,,. are pq and 2v/(v-2),  and v (v > 0)  is the 
degrees of freedom parameter. The (J - 1) X (J -  1) 
parameter  Z  is  known  as  the  scatter  matrix.  This 
distribution happens to be equivalent to the predictive 
distribution, under certain conditions, when using the 
additive logistic normal (see Aitchison 1986, 174). 
This model differs from the additive logistic normal 
when v < w,  and it differs more the smaller is v. We 
find in practice that our estimates of v are fairly small, 
and thus the LT distribution differs significantly from 
the additive logistic normal.6 For example, Figure 3 
gives two ternary diagrams with normal (for A) and t 
(for  B)  confidence regions fit  to real  electoral  data 
SO that we consider only cases in which the moments exist on the 
logistic scale, we impose the technical restriction that v > 2. This 
assumption, while not necessary for our model or estimator  (since 
the moments of  the additive logistic t are always finite), does make 
estimation and simulation simpler. Given that our estimates of v stay 
far from the boundary (even when permitted to do otherwise), this 
technical assumption is unambiguously supported by  our data. 
FIGURE 3.  The Fit of the Logistic Normal 
and Logistic t Distribtions 
A. Normal Based Confidence Regions 
B.  t Based Confidence Regions 
Note: Both  graphs give a ternary diagram for  1970 British  House of 
Commons electoral data, with  uncontested districts deleted, and 50% 
and 95% confidence regions based on the additive logistic normal in  (A) 
and additive logistic t in  (B).  The better fit to the t distribution is indicated 
by the approximately 50% and 95% of  the constituencies  that fall within 
the 50% and 95% confidence region, respectively,  for thet distribution, 
but only 64% and 91 % for the normal. Note also how the inner region 
is  much  narrower, and  the outer region  is  wider, for the t than  the 
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(from  1970). For  both,  the  inner  loop  is  the 50% 
confidence region; if the model is appropriate, half the 
points should fall within it. In fact, 66.7% fall within the 
normal-based region, whereas  48.5%  fall within  the 
t-based  region. A  similar  situation,  but  slightly  less 
extreme, holds for the 95% confidence region, which is 
the outer loop in both graphs. (Because of  the large 
number of constituencies, the figure is more useful for 
understanding the differences in how the two models fit 
these data and the nature of confidence regions on the 
simplex, rather than  making  it  easy  to count  points 
within  each  region.)  This  demonstrate~s clearly  the 
advantage  of  the t  distribution  for  British  electoral 
data.7 
When v is sufficiently  large, the normal and t distri- 
butions are identical. This means that our generaliza- 
tion has great potential benefits, because it fits a much 
wider range of data more common in multiparty de- 
mocracies, and it is also essentially costless (i.e., except 
for the trivial efficiency loss caused by  estimating the 
extra degrees of  freedom parameter). Given this risk 
profile, there seems little reason not to use this more 
general model. 
The generalization that the additive logistic t pro- 
vides would be traditionally described (by  using the 
general textbook description for t-based distributions) 
as allowing for "fatter tailsn-a  small number of  con- 
stituencies surprisingly (according to the normal) far 
from the center of the distribution. This description is 
accurate, but perhaps a more informative characteriza-' 
tion is the other half of  the story: When v is small, most 
of the constituencies are surprisingly (according to the 
normal) heavily clustered together (compare the inner 
confidence region in the two graphs in Figure 3). That 
is, what the traditional description of t-based distribu- 
tions misses is that when v is small, a t distribution with 
the same variance as a normal has both fat tails and 
heavier  cluster  around  the  mode.  The two  features 
must  exist  simultaneously  to  counterbalance  each 
other, in order that the result is a proper distribution. 
Our reason for also emphasizing the heavy cluster is 
that this describes more of the points than focusing on 
the relatively small number of  outliers in the tails. 
As can be seen by the counts of  districts within the 
confidence regions in Figure 3, the additive logistic t 
model fits the data better  than  the additive logistic 
normal. The substantive reason is that most constitu- 
encies in  England  have vote  fractions that  are very 
similar to one another, but a smaller set of constituen- 
cies are quite far from this main cluster. 
In Figure 4 we present summaries of  the fit of  the 
two  distributions for all the elections in our data. It 
shows for each election year the percentage of  districts 
that  fall within the 50%, 80%, and  95% confidence 
regions. Figure 4A shows that for the additive logistic 
normal  model, the actual  fractions  of  points within 
each of  these  regions (indicated by  solid lines) vary 
7 The fit of the model could be closer to a normal after conditioning 
on explanatory variables,  but  our studies indicate that this is not 
usually the case with our multiparty data. We present the simple case 
in Figure 3, without covariates, for ease of  presentation. 
quite a distance from the theoretically correct (straight 
dotted) lines. (For visual clarity, the solid lines connect 
the points at the elections, where the estimation was 
actually conducted.) In contrast, the actual and theo- 
retical values are very close for the additive logistic t, 
portrayed in Figure 4B. The normal seems to fit better 
for more recent elections than it once did, but there is 
no reason to think that this trend will continue. 
For applications, we let the means of the log-ratios 
be linear functions of vectors of  explanatory variables: 
where Xij is a pj x 1 vector of  explanatory variables, 
and  p,  are  parameters  to  be  estimated.  For  most 
applications the explanatory variables will be the same 
for all j, but this is not required. The parameters pj, 2, 
and v are of  little direct interest, but we show below 
how to compute quantities of  interest from them. 
ASSUMPTIONS FOR  PARTLY CONTESTED 
DISTRICTS 
We now introduce methods of  generalizing the basic 
model to allow for districts in which some parties do 
not contest the outcome. 
We follow King and Gelman (1991) by setting as the 
goal of  estimation the effective vote-values  of  VU  that 
we would observe if all J parties contested the election 
in district i. In districts with all parties contesting, the 
effective vote is the observed vote. In partly contested 
districts, the effective vote for all parties is unobserved 
but can be estimated. (That is, in districts in which any 
party chooses not to contest, we lose information about 
the effective vote proportion for all parties, since those 
that contest might get different vote fractions if  they 
were to face more competition.) 
The  effective  vote  concept  covers  all  "national" 
political parties, even if  they do not contest all elec- 
tions. We distinguish regional parties and do not try to 
estimate strained counterfactuals, such as what would 
happen  if  the  Scottish  nationalists  ran  in  English 
constituencies. Regional parties are easy to include in 
our model, but for expository purposes we  omit this 
issue here. 
In order to analyze the effective vote in districts not 
fully contested, some assumptions must be made. We 
introduce  several  designed for  electoral  systems  in 
which the candidates and parties decide for themselves 
whether  to contest a district election.8 A reasonable 
assumption under these circumstances is that a non- 
contesting party would not have won if  it had nomi- 
nated a candidate. After all, if  they would have won, 
they probably would have nominated someone in the 
Other  assumptions  would  be  necessary  when,  for  example,  a 
progovernment  election  commission  prevents  opposition  parties 
from entering a race because they  might win,  as occurs  in  some 
fledgling Eastern European  democracies.  Similarly, when  a  small 
party makes a deal with a larger party not to contest in certain areas 
(as in the recent New Zealand elections), these assumptions would 
not hold.  Our model could be modified  accordingly. In all cases, 
scholars should tune the model assumptions to what we know about 
the details of  party politics. American Political Science Review  Vol. 93, No. 1 
FIGURE 4.  Confidence Region Coverage 
A. Coverage of Normal Confidence Regions 
Year 
B.  Coverage of  t Confidence Regions 
Note: These graphs summarize the fit of the additive logistic normal (A) and additive logistic t (B) distributions  for all U.K. elections in our data set. For 
each election, the solid lines mark the percentage of coverage for the 50%, 80%, and 95% confidence regions (where dotted lines are drawn). The better 
fit of the t distribution is indicated  by the actual number of constituencies within each region (indicated by the solid line) staying much closer to the dotted 
line for the t than for the normal. 
first place. Even if this assumption is false, it is unlikely  that did nominate  candidates, and so we expand the 
that any statistical analyst can devise a more realistic  assumption to this  more  encompassing version. We 
assumption than the noncontesting party is effectively  recognize that  this  broader  assumption  occasionally 
able to do for us.  may not hold. In other words, it is conceivable that the 
It  also  seems highly likely  that  the noncontesting  noncontesting party, if  it  ran, might  get more votes 
party would have received fewer votes than the parties  (and yet still lose) than one of the parties that chose to A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
run. Yet,  even  if  this  assumption were violated, the 
degree of  violation would very rarely be large enough 
to make a substantive difference. Moreover, the alter- 
native  possible  assumptions are more  arbitrary  and 
would be difficult to justify. 
Other assumptions could be chosen, based on mod- 
els of  candidate entry and exit for different electoral 
svstems or on different features of the British electoral 
system  (such  as  the  loss  of  a  monetary  deposit  by 
candidates who do not receive a certain fraction of  the 
vote).  Our  methods  for  deriving  the  model  below 
under our chosen assumptions can be easily modified 
to handle these alternatives. 
If  covariates that  predict which  parties  contest  in 
each constituency are available, then they can be used 
in interactions with indicator variables that code for the 
patterns of uncontestedness in order to avoid assump- 
tions  about  parameter  equivalence between  district 
elections that are fully and partly contested. In most 
cases, these variables will be useful but not necessary. 
An  alternative is  to develop full-blown models that 
predict which parties contest in each district as sepa- 
rate equations. Although future researchers may wish 
to consider this approach, we do not pursue it because 
it  is unnecessary, would make the model less robust, 
and would require data that are very hard to obtain in 
most applications. 
We  make  no  assumption  analogous to  "indepen- 
dence of  irrelevant alternatives," as is sometimes nec- 
essary  for  individual-level,  survey-based  statistical 
models of  multiparty voter  choice (see Alvarez  and 
Nagler n.d.). That is, our assumptions, and the model 
built from them, allow the entry or exit of a party into 
a district election contest to affect  the relative vote 
totals of  the parties already in the race. 
ESTIMATION 
In this section, we propose methods of  estimating the 
parameters of  the model, P = {Pj}, Z, and v. In the 
next section, we explain how to compute quantities of 
interest given these results. 
If  all  districts are contested by  all parties, we  can 
estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood. That 
is, we would maximize the log of the additive logistic t 
distribution in  equation 5, summed over all observa- 
tions, with respect to the parameters.  Complications 
arise in partly contested districts, however. One attrac- 
tive approach for missing data problems such as this is 
to use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods 
(see Tanner 1997). For example, impute the missing 
data given a guess for the parameters; then estimate 
the parameters given these "completed" data via max- 
imum  likelihood;  then  use  these  better  parameter 
estimates to impute more realistic values for the miss- 
ing data; and so on, until (stochastic) convergence. 
We implemented a version of the MCMC approach, 
but in our experience and with our three-party data, 
this procedure is relatively slow, primarily because each 
of  the two steps in every iteration is itself iterative. We 
offer a direct likelihood approach that is approximately 
twenty  times  faster.  Our  studies  indicate  that  this 
alternative is faster for smaller numbers of parties, but 
the MCMC approach may  be more computationally 
efficient for larger numbers of  parties. 
Our description of  the direct likelihood approach 
begins by  denoting the set  of  parties  contesting the 
election in district i as Pi,  a set that can take on seven 
patterns: (1, 2, 3), (2, 31, (1, 3), (1, 21, {I), (21, and 
{3>.9 
When the effective vote is observed for all parties, 
the likelihood is the probability density of  the observed 
variables. For simplicity, we write the likelihood as a 
function of  Y,  rather than V,,  although the two give 
equivalent  results.  For  districts with  fully  contested 
elections, the observed vote (V:l,  V:,,  V:3)  equals the 
effective vote (Vil, Viz, Vi3). Thus, Yil  = 1n(VillK3) 
and  Y,,  =  ln(Vi,IK3)  are both  observed, and  the 
likelihood function is the bivariate t probability density: 
with parameters 
(and where ul, u,,  and p make up the scatter matrix). 
This density differs from the additive logistic t for Vi  in 
equation 5 by  a constant factor (the Jacobian of  the 
transformation),  which  thus  establishes  the  equiva- 
lence of writing the likelihood as a function of either Vi 
or Y,. 
When some of  the effective votes are not observed 
(due to noncontesting parties), our assumptions desig- 
nate a region in which the vote variable falls, in which 
case the likelihood is the area (or volume) under the 
probability density corresponding to this known region. 
The Appendix derives the likelihood function for these 
cases. 
The complete likelihood function is the product of 
the likelihoods for the fully contested case in equation 
7 as well as the partially contested cases derived in the 
Appendix and given in equations 12,15, 16, 17,18, and 
19: 
where we define the product over a null set (when no 
district election of  the type exists) as equaling unity. 
We  also substitute  pil = XilPl and piz = Xi&  to 
introduce (overlapping, identical, or different sets of) 
covariates Xi, and Xi,.  For our present application, we 
define Xi, and Xi, to include a lag of  Yil, a lag of  Y,,, 
and three indicator variables to represent incumbency 
status for each party. We have conducted many other 
runs with demographics and other variables included, 
but, as is consistent with the results from analyses in the 
United  States  and  other  democracies, these  tend to 
have only minor effects on our estimates of incumbency 
advantage. Since our goal is to estimate the total causal 
effect of  incumbency status, we exclude covariates that 
9 Suppose they held  an election  and nobody ran? We ignore this 
amusing eighth possible pattern, despite its occasional appearance in 
some very low-visibility local U.S. elections. In general, the number 
of  patterns of  missing data is 2J. American Political Science Review  Vol. 93, No. 1 
are consequences of  this key causal variable (for the 
same reason that in estimating the effect of an individ- 
ual's unemployment on his or her vote, we would not 
wish to control for voting intentions five minutes before 
walking into the voting booth; see Cox and Katz 1996; 
Gelman and King 1990; and King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994, 173-5). 
To facilitate maximization, and to make the asymp- 
totic normal approximations we use below feasible with 
fewer observations, it  is  helpful to reparameterize so 
that all parameters are unbounded  (ranging between 
-a and w), as p1 and p,  already are. Thus, the full set 
of  transformations is: 
where the form of the equation for $,  is the inverse of 
Fisher's Z transformation (keeping p between -  1  and 
1 no  matter  what  value  $,  takes)  and  that  for  $, 
constrains v to be greater than two in order to guaran- 
tee that the moments of  the distribution on the logistic 
scale exist. 
To summarize all our knowledge about and uncer- 
tainty in the parameter vector 
we maximize the likelihood function. This gives us an 
asymptotic normal posterior distribution with the max- 
imum likelihood point estimates as a mean vector and, 
as usual, the inverse of  the negative of  the Hessian as 
the variance matrix10 
Because maximum  likelihood is  invariant to repa- 
rameterization (see King 1989b), the same point esti- 
mates are obtained whether we estimate $ and trans- 
form to get $ or estimate $ directly. We also use the 
standard empirical Bayes approach to specify normal 
priors  (i.e., the hyperparameters  are estimated  from 
the means and variances of  the maximum likelihood 
estimates across our ten election years). Our empirical 
results  below  are  qualitatively  the  same  as  with 
straightforward  maximum  likelihood,  but,  as  usual, 
empirical Bayes helps to reduce the random variability 
across and within years. 
COMPUTING QUANTITIES OF INTEREST 
Because the point of developing a model of voting in a 
multiparty democracy is to explain and predict election 
lo  We verified this asymptotic normal approximation by comparisons 
with the exact (i.e., fmite sample) posterior distribution, thus avoid- 
ing the large-n assumption altogether. We did this with the technique 
of importance sampling, an iterative simulation method based on a 
probabilistic rejection algorithm (see Tanner 1997). Our experiments 
indicate that the point estimates we report below are correct, and the 
standard errors are if  anything conservative (is., somewhat larger 
than they should be). Because importance sampling is very compu- 
tationally intensive and hence would be more difficult for others to 
apply, and since we found that the two approaches did not suggest 
any real substantive differences in our data, the analyses below are 
based on the asymptotic normal approximation. 
results, our model ought to be capable of  computing 
quantities on the scale of  reported votes. That is, the 
estimated $ parameters that result from maximizing 
the likelihood are important, but they are of  little direct 
interest.  For  starters,  they  are  reparameterized  for 
estimation via equation 10. But even transforming back 
to the original $ scale, by  inverting these equations, is 
not very helpful since the estimation was done on the 
additive  logistic  scale  rather  than  on  the  scale  of 
substantive interest-the  votes. The quantities of direct 
substantive interest are complicated functions of these 
parameters. 
Computing some of  these quantities of  interest is 
possible analytically (through Taylor series approxima- 
tions and the like), but it would be difficult. Computing 
many others is impossible. We simplify these problems 
by  substituting computer time for human effort via  an 
increasingly popular technique called random simula- 
tion  (also called stochastic simulation, Monte Carlo 
simulation, etc.)  (see  Gelman  et  al.  19'95; Jackman 
1996; Tanner 1997). Because simulation can generate 
results with any desired degree of precision, the tech- 
nique  entails  no  compromises  (given  a  sufficiently 
powerful computer). The methods  for interpretation 
and presentation we use here are also applicable in the 
context  of  most  other  statistical models  (see  King, 
Tomz, and Wittenberg 1998). 
We describe the calculation of  three quantities of 
interest in this section, a predicted vote, an expected 
Vote, and a causal effect. With each, we use a combi- 
nation of  classical and Bayesian techniques. We save 
the calculation of  other quantities, such as bias and 
responsiveness, for a future article. 
Predicted Vote 
The quantity of  interest here is the probability distri- 
bution describing the predicted allocation of  votes in a 
district conditional on  a fixed  value for each of  the 
explanatory variables. The prediction  is  therefore  a 
probability distribution over the simplex. 
Our first requirement is a method for drawing one 
random election result from the approximate posterior 
distribution given the estimated model, which we label 
(ppl, rp,,  Vp3),  where p is prediction  and the tilde 
indicates that the values have been simulated. We draw 
this  simulated  district election  result  given  a set  of 
values for the explanatory variables Xpl and X ,  (each 
being row vectors). To accomplish th~s  we fofiow this 
algorithm: 
Maximize  the  likelihood  function  in  equation  9 
(with the empirical Bayes priors),  and r~cord  the 
vector of maximum likelihood estimates, $, and the 
variance matrix, V(C$). 
Take one random draw of $, which we designate as 
6, from  a  mu1tivaria;e  Annormal distribution  with 
mean $ and variance V($). 
Reparameterize from 6 to (J  by  using equation 10, 
where we  use Xpl  and Xp,  in computing ppl and 
PP2. A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
4.  Draw ypl and  Yp2  randomly  from  a  bivariate  t 
distribution with parameters +. 
5.  Compute ppl, P ,,  and T/,!  deterministically from 
Fpl and Fp2  by  t$  multivar~ate  logistic transforma- 
tion in equation 4. 
To compute the distribution of election results given 
X,,  we repeat steps 2-5  of  this algorithm M times (we 
find that M = 1,000 is sufficient for most purposes). 
Then our approximate posterior distribution of  Vpl  is 
merely  a histogram of  the simulated values. A point 
estimate of  the three-party  vote results can be com- 
puted by  taking the numerical average of  the simula- 
tions for each party. A standard error can be computed 
by taking the standard deviation of the simulations for 
each party. Similarly, a (say) 80% confidence interval 
can be computed by  sorting the values in numerical 
order  and  taking  the  values  at  the  10th  and  90th 
percentiles. The full approximate posterior distribution 
may be calculated by a two-dimensional histogram over 
the simplex. 
For an example of simulating predictive quantities of 
interest, we give an inference about a predicted value 
from  a  typical  open  seat.  To be  specific, we  first 
estimated the model for 1987 with lags of  Y,,  and Y,, 
and two indicators for incumbency status. We included 
all variables in both equations. We then set the explan- 
atory variables (Xpl and X,,)  such that no candidate 
standing for  election is  a member  of  the House  of 
Commons, and the previous vote (i.e., in 1983) is equql 
to the average vote across constituencies (V,,  = 0.46, 
V  = 0.28,  and VpA  = 0.26). We then applied the 
ahirithm above to yield 500 simulations of  the three 
vote vectors. 
We use two graphical methods  for portraying the 
results from this prediction, both shown in Figure 5. 
Figure  5A plots  the 500  simulations in  one ternary 
diagram.  The  simulations  are  all  predictions  for  a 
single district and thus vary only due to uncertainty in 
the prediction; the collection of dots in this figure then 
portrays the full nature of  the probabilistic prediction 
about where the point (given the values of  the explan- 
atory variables) is likely to be. That is, we have higher 
confidence that the actual district vote in the average 
open seat district will be where the heavy cluster of tie 
dots falls, and the result will fall with smaller probabil- 
ity where there are fewer dots. Substantively,  the result 
shows that this typical district is very likely to be won by 
the Conservatives, since most of the points fall into the 
upper third of the triangle. (The actual probability that 
this district will be won by the Conservatives equals ihe 
fraction of  simulated dots that fall in this top region, 
defined bv the win lines.) 
Figure 5B gives density estimates (smooth versions 
of  histograms) for each of the three vote variables. This 
graph helps emphasize the separate, but still obviously 
related,  nature  of  the three variables. Each  density 
estimate  portrayed  in  the  graph  is  an  approximate 
posterior  distribution of  that  quantity (i.e., it can be 
thought  of  as  a pile  of  predictions  or simulations), 
indicating where the future value of  that vote is likely 
to  be.  Judging  from  the  very  little  overlap  in  the 
FIGURE 5.  Simulations of  a Predicted Value 
A. Ternary Plot of Predicted Votes 
Note: This figure interprets the results of  a model by computing the 
distributional  implications  of a single prediction (for an open seat in the 
constituency with the average vote). Graph A plots 500 simulations from 
this prediction  on a ternary diagram; Graph B gives density estimates of 
the simulations from the same three vote variables. According to the 
prediction, the district's vote heavily favors the Conservatives. 
B. Density Plot of Predicted Votes 
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distributions, it is highly likely that the Conservatives 
will  out-poll  the  Labour  and  Alliance  parties.  The 
Labour Party will likely do better than the Alliance in 
this constituency, but because of  the heavy overlap in 
these two distributions, this inference is less certain. 
Note that all information in B can also be found in A, 
although the images emphasize different aspects of the 
data. 
In an application with a variety of  explanatory vari- 
12- 
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ables, we would normally do many different computa- 
tions such as this. That would enable the researcher to 
understand the many substantive implications of mod- 
els like this. To do so, we would set the explanatory 
variables at many different sets of  values (low income 
and heavily minority, high income and rural, etc.). In 
this situation, we may wish more parsimonious summa- 
ries of  the simulations, such as point estimates, stan- 
dard errors, and confidence intervals. 
Expected Vote 
Our knowledge of  all real-world random processes is 
affected by both fundamental variability and estimation 
variability. The latter results from the limited number 
of  observations collected (or the limited number  of 
districts analyzed). If n were very large, then estimation 
variability would vanish. In contrast, even if we had an 
infinite number of  observations, the fundamental vari- 
ability in  the real world would still prevent our vote 
predictions from being perfect. Estimation variability is 
introduced  because  of  the  investigators'  "failings," 
whereas fundamental variability affects results because 
the world we study is intrinsically variable. 
Our  procedure  for  computing the predicted  vote 
reflects both  sources of  variability. In  the preceding 
algorithm, step 2 simulates estimation variability (by 
drawing + from its distribution), and step 4 simulates 
fundamental variability  (by  drawing the logit of  the 
vote variables from a t distribution). Since we wished 
the simulations to reflect our knowledge of  the distri- 
bution of votes, both sources of variability were essen- 
tial. 
Closely related to computing the predicted vote is 
estimating the expected vote  in  a  district: [E(Vpl), 
E(Vp2), E(Vp3)]. Like the predicted vote, the expected 
vote also is conditional on chosen values of the explan- 
atory variables, X,.  Although fundamental variability 
affects our estimate of  the expected value, we need to 
average over it to produce  the expectation. In other 
words, the expected vote is fixed, and only our estima- 
tion of it is imperfect: If  n were sufficiently large, then 
the expected vote simulations would  be constant. In 
practice, of  course, our estimation procedure will pro- 
duce uncertain estimates of the (fixed) expected vote.11 
To compute one  simulation of  the expected vote, 
which we denote [E(v,,),  E(v,,),  E(vP3)],  we follow 
this algorithm. 
1. Maximize  the  likelihood  function  in  equation  9. 
(with  the  empirical Bayes  priors),  and keep the 
vector of maximum iikelihood estimates, +, and the 
variance matrix, V(+) . 
2.  Take one random draw of +, which we designate as 
6, from  a  multivariate nnormal distribution  with 
mean + and variance V(+). 
3.  Reparameterize from 6 to t$ by  using equation 10, 
l1 The difference between the expected vote and the predicted vote 
resides primarily in the variability around the mean. If  the model 
were linear, then the average of the simulations of the predicted and 
expected vote would be identical; in our case, the two are close. 
where we use X,,  and Xp2 in computing ppl  and 
pp2, respectively. 
4.  Draw m  values of  Fpl and Fp2  randomly from  a 
bivariate t  distribution with  parameters I$.  (m  = 
100 is usually sufficient.) 
5.  Compute m simulations of vel and vp2  detcrminis- 
tically from each of  the m  simulations of  Ypl  and 
Fp2  by using the multivariate logistic transformation 
in equation 4. 
6. Calculate the numerical average of  the m  simula- 
tions of vpl  and rp2  to yield one simulation of  the 
expected votes, E(Vpl)  and  E(v,,),  respectively. 
Compute the simulation of  !he  expected vote for 
party J  = 3 by  subtraction: E(V,,)  = 1 - E(Vp1) 
- E(VP2). 
We repeat steps 2-6  of  this algorithm M times to 
produce M simulations of the expected vote, the mean 
of which is our point estimate, the standard deviation is 
the standard error, and a histogram ofkach component 
is the full probability density (M = 1,000 is usually 
sufficient). 
Causal Effects, Including Incumbency 
Advantage 
A causal effect is the difference between two expected 
votes, given a change in the value of  only one explan- 
atory variable. For example, the incumbency advantage 
is the difference in the expected vote in a district with 
an incumbent running  and the expected vote in the 
same district at the same time when the incumbent's 
party decides to nominate the best available nonincum- 
bent willing to run (Gelman and King 1990). That is, 
under this thought experiment, everything is held con- 
stant up to the start of  the general election campaign, 
at which point the incumbent either runs for reelection 
or does not. 
The causal effect of  incumbency status in multiparty 
democracies is, of course, somewhat more complicated 
than in two-party systems. The effect on the expected 
vote of, for example, a Conservative incumbent seeking 
reelection may be of  a different magnitude than for an 
Alliance or Labour incumbent. Such a partisan differ- 
ential also would seem more likely in legislatures with 
more  parties.  In  multiparty  democracies, we  might 
estimate the incumbency advantage averaged over the 
parties, but we  prefer to estimate each separately in 
order to highlight several interesting substantive differ- 
ences in our data. 
Computing a causal effect thus requires two sets of 
expected votes, one with an incumbent and the other 
without. To draw simulations of  the causal effect of 
incumbency, we take the difference between a simula- 
tion of  the expected vote when the incumbency status 
variable in Xp indicates (1) a particular party's incum- 
bent is running for reelection  and (2)  an open seat, 
with  all  other variables held  constant  at  (say) their 
means. That is, we maximize the likelihood and then 
run the expected value algorithm twice, with a change 
only in the incumbency status variable. 
We estimated the advantage due to three types of A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
FIGURE 6.  Incumbency Advantage 
Effect of Conservative lncumbent 
59  64  66  70  74(F)  74(0)  79  83  87  92  S.E. 
Effect of Labour lncumbent 
-1.0  IC  A 
59  64  66  70  74(F)  74(0)  79  83  87  92  S.E. 
Effect of Alliance lncumbent 
59  64  66  70  74(F) .  740  79  83  87  92  S.E. 
Note: The vertical distance of each arrow above the line indicates the advantage of running an incumbent, as compared to a nonincumbent, to the party 
indicated. The direction of the arrow shows from which of the other parties support is being drawn (as indicated by the ends of the standard error bars, 
at the right). Note that the scale, in percentage points for all three parties, is larger for the Alliance graph than for the other two. 
changes in incumbency status-open  seat to a Conser- 
vative incumbent, an open seat to a Labour incumbent, 
and an open seat to an Alliance incumbent-in  each of 
the ten election years from  1959 to 1992. The addi- 
tional complication is that for one year, and for one 
type of  incumbency effect, we need to record changes 
to all three vote variables. To display all this informa- 
tion succinctly, we have devised a new graphical dis- 
play. Figure 6 presents the raw results for each year 
and type of  effect. The top panel shows the effect of  a 
Conservative incumbent, and each arrow in the large 
left portion of this graphic is the change from an open 
seat-which  we construct so that it begins at the point 
on  the line at the year indicated-to  where  the ex- 
pected vote would be with a Conservative incumbent, 
as if  each were part of  a ternary diagram. Hence, the 
higher each arrow extends vertically (i.e., not the length 
of  the arrow, although the two are obviously related), 
the larger is the incumbency advantage to the Conser- 
vatives. The left axis is in percentage points of  incum- 
bency advantage. 
The direction each arrow leans indicates from which 
party the Conservatives draw votes when they run an 
incumbent  versus  running  another  candidate  in  an 
open contest, with the vertices of  the implicit ternary 
diagram indicated around the standard  errors at the 
right. (Note also that there is a standard error in each 
direction, indicated by the length of  each of  the stan- 
dard  error  arrows at  the right.12)  For  example,  the 
arrow for 1964 Alliance incumbents leans away from 
the bottom left, which means Alliance incumbents get 
electoral  advantage by  drawing votes  disproportion- 
ately from Labour Party candidates (L in the standard 
error part of the graph on the right). (Arrows at angles 
between the extremes indicated on the standard error 
graph draw from a proportionate combination of  the 
two other parties.) Thus, in the top panel, since all the 
arrows lean at least somewhat to the right, Conserva- 
tive  incumbents  derive  their  advantage  by  drawing 
more from the Alliance than from the Labour Party. 
To our knowledge, this type of  effect  has  not  been 
estimated in the elections literature of  any country. 
The most striking observation about Figure 6 is the 
unambiguous positive effect of  incumbency, for all ten 
12 Because the Alliance receives many fewer votes on average than 
the other parties, the maximum range of votes that could be drawn 
from the Alliance to form an incumbency advantage for any other 
party's incumbent is quite small. As a result, the Alliance standard 
errors in figures 6 and 7 are smaller than for the Conservatives or 
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FIGURE 7.  Average Incumbency Advantage 
Conse  wative 
Average  S.E. 
Labour 
Average  S.E. 
Average  S.E. 
Note: This figure gives the incumbency advantage averaged over all the 
years  portrayed in Figure 6, for which the interpretation is analogous. 
Note the scale for the Alliance graph, which is larger than the others. 
elections and all three parties over half  a century of 
British  politics.  This  is  indicated  by  all  30  arrows 
pointing above the zero line. Most  of  the individual 
effects in Figure 6 are larger than their standard errors. 
When  pooled,  the  average  effects  for  each  party's 
incumbent are from two to five times their  standard 
errors, and hence by  any relevant statistical standard 
they are clearly greater than zero. 
Figure 7 gives these average effects for each party. 
(As always, the standard error of  an average is smaller 
than the standard error of its independent component 
parts.)  The summary in  Figure  7 indicates that  the 
average incumbency effect is about half  a percentage 
point for the Conservatives and twice that for Labour. 
In fact, in  every  one of  the  ten elections shown  in 
Figure 6, the Labour incumbency effect is larger than 
the  Conservative  effect.  Our  interpretation  of  this 
disparity (which is necessarily more speculative than 
our results) is that Labour incumbents have a working- 
class constituency that benefits more from government 
services than Conservative  voters. Incumbents have the 
discretion to influence the position of  people on vari- 
ous types of lists for social services, such as to get into, 
or renovate, council housing. Conservative incumbents 
have fewer such opportunities to serve their relatively 
more wealthy constituents, so their incumbency advan- 
tage should not be as large. 
Alliance incumbents receive an advantage of  three 
percentage points (thrice the Labour advantage). This 
is less than the incumbency advantage af 8-9  percent- 
age  points  in  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives 
(Gelman and King 1990), but it is only slightly smaller 
than the average advantage in the House in the mid- 
1960s or in  most  American  state  legislatures today 
(King 1991). This effect is in part because the counter- 
factual involved  in  an open  seat versus an Alliance 
incumbent is much less likely in parts of  Britain than 
the analogous counterfactual involved for estimating 
major party incumbency effects. An  Alliance incum- 
bent implies that the major party hold on the political 
'  system has been broken, and voters take this cue to 
reevaluate  their  votes.  Expressed  another  way,  the 
collective  action  problem  of  moderate  voters  who 
prefer the Alliance but do not want to waste their vote 
is  solved with an Alliance incumbent in  office. They 
have less reason to vote strategically ("tactically," as it 
is called in Britain) and instead cast their vote for their 
sincere preference. Much more than the major parties, 
the Alliance runs local, almost  U.S.-style, candidate- 
centered  campaigns  (sometimes  nominating  well- 
known nonpolitical personalities), rather than national, 
party-oriented campaigns. The result, we believe, is the 
large Alliance incumbency advantage. 
Taken together, our findings support the claims of 
the new quantitative literature on the existence of  the 
incumbency effect in Britain, but the size of  the effect 
for all three parties is substantially smaller than previ- 
ous biased methods had indicated. That is, our method 
is not biased and is also sufficiently powerful to be able 
to distinguish a small (but politically meaningful) effect 
from none at all. Our method is also able to discern 
distinctly different incumbency effects across the three 
parties. 
There appears to be a hint in the top panel of  Figure 
6 that the Conservative incumbency advantage may be 
growing  slightly,  but  formal  statistical  tests  clearly 
reject this possible trend. Moreover, Labour or Alli- 
ance  incumbency  effects  display  no  such  apparent 
pattern. Thus, we find no support for the other claim of 
the new quantitative literature, which  argues, against 
the conventional wisdom, that the incumbency advan- 
tage has been dramatically increasing in recent years. 
When the Conservatives run an incumbent (as com- A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data  March 1999 
pared to no incumbent running), they pull most of their 
extra  incumbency  advantage  from  the  Alliance. As 
explained, this can be seen because the arrow in the 
first panel of  Figure 7 and all ten arrows in the first 
panel of Figure 6 lean to the right-away  from the "A" 
in the standard  error diagram. Our interpretation of 
this clear result is  that the Alliance is  a transitional 
option for voters on the way to supporting one of  the 
major parties; only 20% of  voters stick with the Alli- 
ance for more than one election (Butler and Stokes 
1969,315-38). Presumably because the Labour incum- 
bency advantage stems more from constituency service 
than does the Conservatives' advantage (and because 
there  are usually  as  many  Conservative voters  who 
could benefit from  a Labour  member's  constituency 
services  as  there  are  voters  for  the  much  smaller 
Alliance who  could benefit), Labour incumbents pull 
approximately equally from the Conservatives and the 
Alliance (see Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987).l3 
CONCLUQING REMARKS 
Our results may help resolve an ongoing debate in the 
British elections literature. The conventional position 
is that incumbency has never been an advantage. In 
contrast,  a  newer  literature  holds  that  incumbency 
advantage is moderate to large and is growing. With 
our approach, we find that both sides are right to an 
extent. That is, the incumbency advantage in England 
is  small but  meaningfully  above zero.  There  is  no 
evidence, however, that it is trending in any direction. 
In addition, our model detects important  differences 
among the parties, with the incumbency advantage for 
Labour being about twice that for the Conservatives, and 
the advantage for the Alliance triple that of Labour. 
We  have  developed  and  presented  our  statistical 
model for three parties  and applied it to the British 
electoral system. The model and estimation procedures 
are all directly applicable to electoral systems with any 
number of  parties. Further research will be necessary 
to implement the more general version of  our model. 
Our analytical approach, while much faster for three 
parties, does not scale up as well as a more general 
MCMC approach. Our experiments with MCMC ap- 
plied to this problem convince us that it will scale fairly 
well. Priors may be needed, given the large number of 
parameters  relative to a smaller number  of  districts, 
but there is substantial information in multiparty elec- 
toral systems that would be extraordinarily valuable to 
researchers in  comparative politics, so this extension 
seems well  worth  the  effort.  Our  graphical displays 
obviously do not generalize directly to more than four 
parties, but with judicious  use of  color, shading, and 
l3  The Alliance does not predictably draw more from either major 
party.  There is  one other  feature  of  the last  panel  of  Figure  6, 
however, that may reflect a systematic pattern: Alliance incumbency 
advantage  was  drawn  almost  exclusively  from  the  Labour  Party 
between 1959 and 1970, but this abruptly changed, and votes started 
to be drawn in different ways  from Labour and the Conservatives 
over the subsequent six elections. Since this "pattern" is based on 
only four elections, further research is required before drawing firm 
substantive conclusions as to its cause. 
perspective, we have found it possible to display results 
for up to eight parties, depending on how complicated 
and empirically clear the relationships are in the data. 
Many opportunities for future research remain, three 
of  which we note here. First, we  can easily extend the 
interpretation of  the model to include other quantities of 
interest, such as bias and responsiveness of  the electoral 
system, which  are important and controversial issues in 
Britain  and  elsewhere.  This  can  be  done  by  clearly 
defining the quantity to be computed and then making 
slight modifications of  the algorithms described above. 
Second, some two-party models of  seats and votes 
have  in recent  incarnations included random  effects 
terms, which are more highly modeled versions of what 
our  empirical Bayes  approach  accomplishes for  the 
multiparty case. These terms help keep the estimates 
reasonable  even if  certain types of  explanatory vari- 
ables are not observed and included in the model. They 
are especially well  suited  to  modelsn of  legislatures, 
since the structure of  the random  effects model can 
reflect the panel structure of  the data. 
Finally,  electoral  systems vary considerably across 
countries. All but two countries have districts of  some 
kind, and most elect legislators to more than one seat 
in a district. Modifications to fit all the different types 
of  electoral systems will require  some detailed work, 
but  these  should  be  achievable  by  straightforward 
extensions of  the model presented here. 
APPENDIX: THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
FOR  PARTIALLY CONTESTED DISTRICTS 
Districts with Two of Three Parties 
Contesting 
First  consider  elections  in which the parties  contesting  in 
district i include Pi = (2,  3). The effective votes for all three 
parties, Vil, Vi2, and Vi3, are unobserved. Nevertheless, our 
assumptions  for  less-than-fully  contested  elections  intro- 
duced  above imply that we  have  some information  about 
these quantities. In particular, we know that Vil < min (Viz, 
Vi3) and therefore Yi,  < min (0, Yi2) or, equivalently, Yl < 
0 and Yl  < Y2. Thus, the likelihood function for this case is 
as follows: 
where  F,  is  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  the 
(univariate) t, 
is the conditional mean of Yi2 given Yil, and 
is the conditional variance. These conditional t distributions 
are analogous and mathematically similar to the more com- American Political Science Review  Vol. 93, No. 1 
monly known conditional normals (see Liu 1994). The func- 
tion in equation  12 is easily calculated by  one-dimensional 
numerical integration. 
By  a  parallel  logic,  the  likelihood  function  for  district 
elections in which parties 1  and 3 contest is: 
When parties 1  and 2 contest, but party 3 is missing, a slight 
computational difference occurs because Vi3 appears in the 
denominator of both Yil and Yi2. As a result, we know, by our 
assumption, that Vi3 < min (Vi,, ViJ,  which translates into 
Yi,  > 0 and Yi2 > 0. Hence: 
where F,  is the cumulative distribution function of  (in this 
context) the bivariate t.  To compute this function, we follow 
the standard procedure of  applying one-dimensional numer- 
ical integration after factoring the joint t  distribution into a 
marginal and conditional-directly  analogous to equation 12. 
Districts with One of Three Parties 
Contesting 
When only party 1 contests (and hence automatically wins), 
we have no information about Yi2, but we know that Yil > 0. 
We use this information to form the likelihood function: 
Similarly, the likelihood function for the remaining  two 
cases is 
and 
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